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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A key process underlying event perception is the segmentation of continuous 
visual input into the discrete actions that make up an event. For example, the event 
“making a cup of coffee” could be segmented into pouring the coffee into a cup, adding 
sugar and milk, and stirring the coffee. It has been proposed that individuals segment 
events by engaging in continuous prediction contingent upon sequential regularities, with 
event boundaries occurring when these predictions fail (Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, 
& Reynolds, 2007). More generally, the existence of predictive mechanisms for 
facilitating perception has long been discussed in the vision science literature. However, 
existing research may overemphasize the importance of moment-to-moment conceptual 
predictions in event segmentation and perception. In particular, it is possible that 
automatic predictions corresponding to higher-level goals and sequence structure are not 
able to guide the ongoing segmentation of events. Consequently, naturalistic perception 
of a coherent action sequence may be influenced by some non-automatic strategic 
capacity-limited predictive process, rather than these proposed default predictions. The 
goal of the studies presented here is to determine the extent to which individuals are able 
to use these strategic predictions in real time event perception. 
 Researchers have explored different ways that prediction might be used in 
perceiving and understanding events. At a basic perceptual level, future locations of 
objects are extrapolated based on prior motion. This effect has been studied in the context 
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of representational momentum. Freyd and Finke (1984) showed participants a stationary 
rectangular stimulus that rotated in an implicit direction of motion across multiple 
presentations. When memory for the final orientation of the stimulus was tested, 
participants had difficulty rejecting a distractor stimulus that was rotated further in the 
implicit direction of motion than had been previously shown. The participants appeared 
to be engaging in a low-level prediction of the future location of the stimulus. 
 Research on reaching and object tracking also provides evidence for how 
prediction and action can interact with prior knowledge. Von Hofsten, et al. (1998) 
presented infants with a moving object that could either travel in a straight line across a 
surface, or change directions at the midpoint of its movement trajectory. Infants’ patterns 
of head turning and reaching suggested they predicted that the object would move along a 
linear path. Even on trials in which the movement was non-linear, the infants’ heads 
continued to move for approximately 200 ms after the object changed its path. 
Additionally, on non-linear trials, infants’ hands moved towards the area of space where 
the object would have traveled if it had moved linearly. Even at an early age, simple 
concepts about object motion, such as the idea that an object will not change its direction 
of motion unless acted upon by an outside force, are able to guide perception and 
prediction. 
 However, prediction is not necessarily limited to simple forward projections of 
motion or location extrapolation based on fundamentals of Newtonian physics. There is 
some evidence to suggest that concepts can affect these lower-level processes. Vinson 
and Reed (2002) demonstrated that the size of displacement in representational 
momentum can be affected by prior knowledge of the stimulus object’s typical motion. 
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For example, an object that typically moves great distances, such as a rocket, will elicit 
more representational momentum, i.e., will be displaced further along its implicit 
direction of motion, than an object that is typically stationary, such as a building. Prior 
knowledge and concepts beyond applications of basic physics affect predictions about 
future states. 
The use of predictions in both perception and action can be even more 
conceptually oriented than suggested by motion extrapolation alone. Theory of mind is 
the process by which individuals reason about the mental states of others, including their 
intentions and goals (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This skill is an important component 
of our ability to predict others’ behavior. While the prediction occurring in 
representational momentum and even reaching appears to be automatic and effortless, 
predictions based on beliefs about others’ mental states may not be. For example, this 
may be the case with the attribution of false beliefs. In one study, a false-belief task was 
used to test whether belief inferences are automatic (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, 
Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006). Participants watched a video in which there was a male 
and a female agent. Both agents saw an object placed in one of two containers. 
Afterwards, the female agent left the room, and the location of the two containers was 
switched. The female agent now falsely believes that the object is still in the previous 
location. Subjects were then presented with either a belief probe (e.g., “She thinks that 
it’s in the box on the left.”) or a reality probe (e.g., “It is true that it’s in the box on the 
right.”). Participants were slower to respond to the belief probe than the reality probe. 
Additionally, if subjects were explicitly instructed to track the female agent’s mental 
state, there was no difference in reaction time for the belief and reality probe responses. 
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The authors argued that this pattern of results indicated that while information regarding 
reality is automatically processed, information about others’ beliefs is not. Therefore, it 
appears that any predictions based upon an individual’s beliefs, and perhaps, by 
extension, their desires and goals, may require time and effort to produce. 
 Previous research provides evidence that perceptual and conceptual predictions 
are both useful processes in perceiving and understanding the motion of objects and the 
behaviors of agents. However, to what extent is prediction useful in perceiving and 
understanding the unfolding of familiar events over time? One proposed use of prediction 
in event perception is determining when one event ends and another begins, or event 
segmentation. Event segmentation is the process by which continuous action is 
partitioned into meaningful events in real time. In laboratory conditions, event 
segmentation is typically measured by asking participants to watch a video and make a 
response when one meaningful event ends and another begins. If participants are asked to 
segment videos into the smallest (fine-grained segmentation) and largest (coarse-grained 
segmentation) units that seem natural, they appear to do so in a way that is hierarchical, 
as coarse event boundaries tend to be aligned with fine event boundaries (Zacks, Tversky, 
& Iyer, 2001). 
 The temporal placement of event boundaries has been shown to correlate with 
perceptual change, such as movement. Using human actors and a dance notation 
measuring changes in body position, one study showed that event boundaries coincided 
with a greater number of physical changes than intervals between the boundaries 
(Newtson, Engquist, & Bois, 1977). Similar studies have been conducted using 
computer-generated stimuli. In a study asking participants to segment a video of 
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animated geometric figures similar to that shown in Heider and Simmel’s (1944) classic 
experiment, both coarse and fine boundaries corresponded to increases and changes in 
movement (Hard, Tversky & Lang, 2006). 
 In addition to these basic perceptual characteristics, it has been argued that event 
segmentation is affected by conceptual changes and knowledge. However, this evidence 
is less direct. One experiment showed that tones inserted near goal completions were 
better remembered than tones inserted at other locations within a video, and the tones that 
did not occur near the goal completions were remembered as occurring nearer to goal 
completions than originally presented (Baird & Baldwin, 2001). The authors argued that 
this pattern of results implies that perceivers group activity into units based on inferred 
intentions, as images taken from movie event boundaries are better remembered than 
those from non-boundary moments (Newtson & Engquist, 1976). 
Another study utilized videos of animated objects participants believed either to 
have been generated by people controlling the objects as in a video game, or via 
computer-generated random movement trajectories (Zacks, 2004). The relationship 
between stimulus movement and event segmentation was stronger in fine segmentation 
than in coarse segmentation, suggesting that non-movement features, perhaps including 
inferred goal acquisition, may affect coarse-grained segmentation. Additionally, the 
relationship between movement and event segmentation was stronger when participants 
believed the movie portrayed randomly generated motion, rather than goal-directed 
behavior. The authors argued that these results indicate that prior knowledge about goal 
states and goal acquisition affects how physical cues are processed when identifying 
event boundaries. However, whether participants used information about potential goal 
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states remains unclear. Additionally, if the participants were using information about goal 
states when generating event boundaries, the sophistication of these goals is difficult to 
elucidate. For example, one can conceive of a goal of moving to a particular location in 
space. However, a more complex goal may organize a series of discrete motions 
occurring in a particular order. 
While event boundaries have been shown to correlate with both perceptual and, 
perhaps, conceptual aspects of ongoing activity, such findings do not explain why event 
boundaries are placed where they are. One possibility is that boundary placement is based 
on predictions about future events. Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks et al., 2007) relies 
upon the continuous generation of perceptual predictions as an explanatory mechanism 
for segmentation. These predictions represent the near future, and they can be as simple 
as the forward displacement of an object’s motion or as complex as predicting a person’s 
actions based on their presumed goals. According to Event Segmentation Theory, 
predictions are generated after multisensory input is transformed into semantically rich 
mental representations, a process that is guided by stable event representations held in 
working memory (known as event models and event schemata). These models contain 
prior knowledge about events, including conceptual information about the likely content 
of an event, such as “which patterns of activity are likely to follow a given pattern, and 
information about actors’ goals” (Zacks et. al, 2007). An error detection mechanism 
compares these predictions with reality. If the current event models are an appropriate 
representation of reality, then little prediction error should occur. However, if the event 
models are not suitable, the predictions will not be accurate. The resulting increase in 
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prediction error causes the updating of the event model, which is perceived as an event 
boundary. 
While the use of predictive mechanisms in visual perception has received much 
attention from researchers, we were specifically interested in examining the use of 
predictions about future events in event perception.  Event segmentation does not 
necessitate the use of a continuous predictive mechanism and the detection of prediction 
errors as the impetus for segmentation. Instead, segmentation could be a concomitant of 
one or many perceptual and conceptual changes, without an explicit reliance on 
prediction failure. Alternatively, one implication of hierarchical theories of event 
perception is that actions may be processed in terms of their links to higher-order goals. 
Consequently, event perception and segmentation may rely on deviations from these 
broad overarching representations but involve relatively little moment-to-moment 
prediction.  Similar to the theory of mind findings presented in Apperly et al., 2006, 
processing the actions that make up an event may be automatic, but determining how 
these events compare to our predictions may require additional processing. To investigate 
this possibility, we conducted a series of experiments testing the extent to which event 
perception involves this type of conceptual prediction. We created live-action movies, 
some of which contained an out of order event. If an individual watched an event that did 
not conform to standard sequential structure, then the momentary predictions made about 
that event should be incorrect and produce prediction error. If this type of continuous 
prediction is crucial to understanding ongoing events, perceivers should be aware of this 
violation of their prediction, and the misordering should be detected. Importantly, the 
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stimuli used here allow for generalizability beyond many past studies as they depict 
everyday events and do not involve repetitive actions. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
In Experiment 1, we were interested in obtaining base rates of misordering 
detection (and false alarms) for our videos. Our hypothesis was that if making predictions 
about upcoming actions is important in event perception, then the detection of out of 
order actions should be facilitated, as these actions should not have been predicted. If 
these predictions are not continuously being made, however, detection would not be 
facilitated, as there would be no on-line predictions available to use when comparing 
perceived and expected events.  
We also examined the effects of a secondary verbal task on performance. If these 
conceptual predictions are used in perceiving and understanding events in our daily lives, 
then it can be assumed (and is assumed by models such as Event Perception Theory) that 
this process is continuous and automatic. If this is true, then we hypothesized that an 
interfering task would have no effect on the detection of out of order actions.  
 In these videos, the out of order action was always located one shot later in the 
action sequence than it would have otherwise belonged. For example, one of the twelve 
videos contained an out of order action sequence showing an actor stirring a cup of coffee 
with a stirrer, after which she picked up the same stirrer from a table and then removed 
the stirrer from the cup. This can be compared to the correct action sequence of picking 
up the stirrer from the table, stirring the coffee, and removing the stirrer from the cup. A 
complete list of the actions contained in this particular stimulus video can be found in 
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Figure 1, with the misordered action occurring in the tenth clip. This clip sequence 
ensured that not only did these out of order actions appear unlikely, but also impossible 
without some elaborate narrative construction on the part of the participants (e.g., 
“Perhaps the video did not show the actor removing the spoon from the cup after stirring 
it, and it then showed the actor stirring the coffee a second time with a new spoon.”).  
 
Clip Action Description 
Normal Video Misordered Video 
1 Establishing shot of actor near coffee pot Same as Normal Video 
2 Actor picks up coffee pot Same as Normal Video 
3 Actor pours coffee into a cup Same as Normal Video 
4 Actor puts coffee pot in its prior location Same as Normal Video 
5 Actor picks up creamer Same as Normal Video 
6 Actor opens creamer container Same as Normal Video 
7 Actor pours creamer into coffee cup Same as Normal Video 
8 Actor opens sugar container Same as Normal Video 
9 Actor pours sugar into coffee cup Same as Normal Video 
10 Actor removes stirrer from its holder Actor stirs coffee with stirrer 
11 Actor stirs coffee with stirrer Actor removes stirrer from its holder 
12 Actor shakes excess liquid off stirrer Same as Normal Video 
13 Actor picks up coffee cup Same as Normal Video 
14 Actor drinks from coffee cup Same as Normal Video 
Figure 1. Example Action Sequence in Normal and Misordered Videos 
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Participants 
 Fifteen undergraduate students (13 female; mean age = 18.80 years, SD = .68) 
were recruited from Vanderbilt University. Participants were compensated with course 
credit. 
 
Methods 
 All videos were played at a resolution of 740 x 480 on a 17-inch screen with a 
1280x1040 resolution. Videos were surrounded by a black border that filled the 
remainder of the screen. All videos were full color Apple QuickTime files compressed 
using DV/DVCPRO at a frame rate of 29.97 per second and with no audio. 
 Each participant watched twelve video sequences consisting of an actor 
performing a familiar task (e.g., making a cup of coffee, using a copy machine). The 
sequence was filmed using multiple camera angles, and shots were zoomed in and 
centered on the most relevant actions after an initial establishing shot. Each shot within a 
video sequence was separated by 67 ms of blank screen. These angle changes, or cuts, 
segmented the sequences into a set of discernible sub-actions (e.g., stirring a cup of 
coffee, lifting the lid of a copy machine). Additionally, some clips in these videos were 
slightly sped up in order to keep clips short. One representative examples of this was a 
shot of a girl walking across a room in a video about sharpening a pencil. The average 
length of the misordered shots was 533 ms, the average length of the videos was 9583 
ms, and there was an average of 11.25 shots within the videos. For all participants, half of 
the videos showed the events in the correct order, while the other half contained a 
misordering in which the order of two actions was switched. Two versions of each of the 
 12 
videos were created – one showing the sequence of actions in the correct order and 
another that contained the out of order sequence. Both the identity of the videos 
containing an out of order action and the order of video presentation were 
counterbalanced across participants.  
 Participants were told that they would see a countdown followed by a sequence of 
events depicting an everyday activity, broken up into shots separated by blank intervals. 
They were also told that for some of the sequences all of the shots would be in the correct 
order, but in others were would be one misordering in which two shots would be out of 
order. Participants were instructed to mark on an answer sheet whether or not they saw a 
misordering after watching each video. Additionally, for half of the trials, participants 
were told they would have to count backwards from a given number by three. Before 
these trials, this number was displayed on the screen for 5000 ms along with a brief 
reiteration of the counting instructions. Participants were told to count out-loud during 
the entire length of the video. The participants’ starting numbers were randomly 
generated and did not differ between participants, although different numbers were 
assigned to the same videos across participants. The presence of this secondary task was 
balanced such that across all of the participants, for any one video, four equally 
represented trial types existed: misordering and a counting task, correct order and 
counting task, misordering and no counting task, and correct order and no counting task.  
 
Results 
 Analyses were conducted to test whether correct classification of the videos was 
affected by the presence of a secondary verbal task (interference, no interference) for 
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both video types (misordering, no misordering). For videos containing a misordered 
event, participants were significantly more likely to detect the presence of the 
misordering on trials without a secondary task (mean = 53.33% correct, SD = 27.60) 
compared to trials with a secondary task (mean = 24.44% correct, SD = 26.62; t(14) = -
2.83, p = .01). However, for videos without a misordered action, the presence of a 
secondary task had no effect on main task performance. Participants were able to 
correctly reject the presence of a misordering for 93.33% (SD = 13.80) of trials when 
there was no secondary task and 86.67% (SD = 21.08) of trials when there was a 
secondary task (t(14) = -.90, p = .38). 
 
 
Figure 2. Effect of Video Type and Secondary Task on Correct Video Classification 
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 We also compared the number of verbal counting responses made across trials 
that ended in a correct or incorrect identification of video type (misordering or no 
misordering) to determine whether performance on the secondary task differed as a 
function of accuracy on the main task. For trials containing the secondary verbal task, 
participants gave a verbal count an average of every 1.61 seconds (SD = .48) for trials 
ending in a correct response and every 1.63 seconds (SD = .72) for trials ending in an 
incorrect response. There was no significant difference in the number of secondary task 
responses per second between trials ending in a correct or an incorrect primary task 
response (t(14) = .14, p = .89).  
 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 1, we determined that not only is the detection of unpredictable, 
out of order events difficult for participants, but their performance on this task further 
deteriorates when asked to complete a secondary task. This inability to reliably detect 
event misorderings indicates that perception may not involve the moment-to-moment 
tracking required in order to predict actions on the timescales represented by these 
stimuli, or that participants may have difficulty accessing the content of any such 
predictions for use in self-report paradigms. Also, the addition of a secondary task 
significantly lowered detection, indicating that generating or using these predictions in 
event perception is not purely a bottom-up mechanism, and online prediction generation 
may deteriorate in real world scenarios under divided attention.     
 Next, we investigated rates of incidental misordering detection. In Experiment 1, 
participants expected to see these out of order actions and were explicitly asked to look 
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for them. While participants had difficulty detecting the out of order sequences, we were 
interested in whether their performance would deteriorate further if the misordering 
detection task was incidental. This incidental version has the additional benefit of being 
more similar to typical event perception. If prediction of upcoming events is important in 
event perception, participants should be able to complete this task without deliberately 
trying to detect when an unexpected event occurs.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Participants 
 Twelve participants (8 female; mean age = 23.41 years, SD = 6.08) were recruited 
from Vanderbilt University and the surrounding community. Participants were monetarily 
compensated. 
 
Methods 
All videos were played at a resolution of 740 x 480 on a 13-inch laptop screen 
with a 1280x800 resolution using Final Cut Pro. Participants viewed the same videos 
used in Experiment 1, but only videos with an out-of-order action were used. 
All participants were told they would be watching a short video of an actor 
performing an everyday activity, and they would answer questions about the video after 
watching. They were not informed of the presence of the misordering. Every participant 
only watched one of the original twelve misordered videos, with each video being 
watched once across all the participants. Immediately after watching the video, they were 
asked a series of questions to determine whether they noticed the out of order event. 
Participants first answered whether they noticed anything unusual about the video. Next, 
they answered whether they noticed anything unusual about the order of events in the 
video. Finally, they answered whether they noticed one of the actions in the video was 
out of order. 
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Results 
 Each of the twelve participants failed to detect the out of order action. No 
participants reported noticing anything unusual about the order of events in the videos or 
that one of the actions in the video was out of order. While some participants reported 
noticing something usual about the video, in follow-up questioning, this always directly 
related to the video’s editing (for example, the presence of the black screen between 
individual shots).  
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 provides evidence for a lack of incidental detection of misordered 
actions. One issue with Experiment 1 is that participants were asked to detect these 
misorderings. It is possible that this request leads them to engage in additional processing 
or strategies to complete the detection task. In Experiment 1, the secondary verbal task 
should have prevented the implementation of some of these strategies, such as on-line 
generation of a list of scenes that the participant could analyze upon the video’s 
conclusion. Experiment 2’s results serve to strengthen the hypothesis that people do not 
predict future actions, at least at this timescale, in order to perceive and understand 
events.  
 One possible explanation for the results of both Experiments 1 and 2 is that the 
videos were difficult to understand. Predictions about future actions, based on preexisting 
event models and schemata, may not be generated if an event is not understood, as a 
usable event schema upon which to base these predictions may not be available. The 
short length of each clip, along with the brief black screen inserted between each action, 
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is atypical when compared to the way in which events are usually perceived. We 
addressed these concerns in Experiments 3a and 3b. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
 In Experiment 3, we tested the degree to which participants may have had 
difficulty perceiving and understanding the events presented to them in Experiments 1 
and 2. Two potential problems were investigated: whether participants had difficulty 
understanding what was taking place in each video as a whole, and whether participants 
had difficulty perceiving the actions taking place in individual clips. 
   
Experiment 3a 
In Experiment 3a, we tested participants’ understanding of each video sequence. 
If participants do not understand what is happening in a particular video, then it would 
seem reasonable that they could not generate predictions for future events, as they would 
have no event schema, or perhaps an incorrect event schema, from which to draw their 
predictions. New versions of each of the twelve videos were created, and participants’ 
understanding of these videos was compared to their understanding of the original video 
stimuli. In particular, we wanted to determine whether the atypical editing style and sped 
up actions of the original videos negatively influenced participants’ understanding of the 
events.  
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Participants 
 Thirty-two undergraduate students (24 female; mean age = 18.69 years, SD = 
1.03) were recruited from Vanderbilt University. Participants were compensated with 
course credit. 
 
Methods 
Stimuli were presented on the same equipment as Experiment 2. Re-edited 
versions of the twelve original videos were created. The goal of these changes was to 
make the editing and speed of actions appear more typical, in order to determine whether 
the atypical editing and increased action speed decreased event understanding in previous 
experiments. First, the 67 msec black screen between each action was removed. Second, 
the videos were re-edited to decrease the number of cuts. This step was necessary in order 
to reconstruct the videos, as the black screens were often interspersed across multiple 
actions shot from similar angles, and simply removing the black screens without further 
reediting would have resulted in highly unnatural jumps both across time and in the 
position of objects or actors. Finally, the sped up clips in the original videos were 
restored to 100% speed. These new videos contained an average of 2.59 shots (SD = 
2.02), each with an average length of 14.16 seconds (SD = 10.00).  
The participants were only shown videos containing the correct order of actions – 
no videos contained an out of order action sequence. Half of the participants watched the 
same versions of these twelve videos as had been shown in Experiment 1. The other half 
of the participants saw the new, re-edited versions of these videos. Participants were 
instructed to write a summary of each video and were told to focus on the actions that 
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made up the event. Summaries were written immediately following each video, and 
participants were given as much time as they desired to write their summaries. A naive 
rater matched participants’ responses against a list of actions performed in each video (2 
to 6 actions per video). The rater indicated whether the participant reported the actions 
for each video, via a binary yes/no rating for each individual action. The number of yes 
ratings and the total number of possible yes ratings were used to calculate a percent 
accuracy score for each trial.  
 
Results 
 Participants correctly recalled more actions for the new typically edited videos 
(91.20%, SD = 6.20) than for the old atypically edited videos (87.30%, SD = 7.90; t(31) = 
2.29, p = .03). While this difference was significant, participants still reported an 
overwhelming majority of actions, regardless of video type. While participants generally 
performed better in the typically edited video condition, average performance was better 
in the atypically edited video condition for four of the twelve videos.   
 We were interested in determining whether misordering detection performance 
was poorer in our previous experiments for the videos that showed a relatively lower 
recall performance in the atypically edited video condition. Misordering detection 
performance for each individual video was compiled from past experiments. These 
experiments include select trials from Experiment 1, along with four additional 
experiments not included in this manuscript. Only trials: 1) with an out-of-order action, 
2) using the original video stimuli with no extra tasks (mimicking the no-interference 
trials of Experiment 1), and 3) using the same population and presentation methods as the 
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experiments described here, were considered. Using these criteria, we were left with 309 
total responses, with 24 to 29 responses per video. Across the twelve videos, there was a 
nonsignificant negative correlation between percent correct responses on the misordering 
detection task and percent correct responses on the event recall task for trials containing 
the original atypically edited videos (r =  -.36, p = .25). This provides further evidence 
that the original misordering detection results were not related to any difficulty in 
comprehending the videos.  
 
Experiment 3b 
In Experiment 3b, we tested participants’ ability to detect the critical out of order 
clip itself in each video. This “critical clip” is the action that participants must see in 
order to detect the misordering. For example, in the action sequence: stir coffee with a 
spoon, pick up spoon from table, and remove spoon from coffee, it is necessary that 
participants see the actor picking up the spoon from the table in order to determine that 
the action sequence was out of order. Even if participants have an understanding of the 
main event taking place in the video (as tested in Experiment 3a), an inability to 
recognize this particular clip would still lead to decreased performance on a misordering 
detection task. If participants do not detect this clip, it would appear that perhaps an 
action is missing, but the sequence appears in the proper order. In this experiment, we 
also continued to test participants’ incidental detection of misordered action sequences 
via a brief post-test questionnaire. 
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Participants 
 Nineteen participants (11 female; mean age = 20.26 years, SD = 4.47) were 
recruited from Vanderbilt University and the surrounding area. Participants were 
compensated with candy, course credit, or cash. 
 
Methods 
 Participants watched the same twelve videos shown in Experiment 1, and the 
videos were presented using the same equipment as Experiment 2.  Each video was 
preceded by the critical target clip that was the second of the two actions involved in the 
misordered act, as described above. Figure 3 contains a partial list of actions in the coffee 
making video, with the critical clip indicated in bold. In this particular video, the critical 
out of order action is “Actor removes stirrer from its holder”, which is the 11th clip of the 
misordered video. The same target clip was used in videos without misordered events, 
although the clip appeared one action earlier in these videos due to the lack of 
misordering. In this example, “Actor removes stirrer from its holder” is the 10th clip in 
the normal version of the video.  
Each trial began with a 5000 ms countdown, followed by a 1000 ms black screen 
and the critical target clip. After viewing the critical clip, the countdown and black screen 
were repeated, followed by the full video. Before the experiment began, participants were 
instructed to press a key on the keyboard as soon as they saw the target clip appear in the 
subsequent video. Reaction times were measured from target onset. Reactions were 
recorded with Final Cut Pro, which is able to flag a frame of a video when a key is 
pressed. We were then able to compute the number of frames between this flagged frame 
 24 
and the first frame of the target clip. Reaction times were generated by converting this 
number of frames into milliseconds. If multiple responses were made during one trial, the 
latest RT was selected for analysis. Participants were not told that any of the videos 
contained an out of order action sequence. 
 
Clip Action Description 
Normal Video Misordered Video 
… … … 
9 Actor pours sugar into coffee cup Same as Normal Video 
10 Actor removes stirrer from its holder Actor stirs coffee with stirrer 
11 Actor stirs coffee with stirrer Actor removes stirrer from its holder 
12 Actor shakes excess liquid off stirrer Same as Normal Video 
… … … 
Figure 3. Example Location of Critical Misordered Clip in Video Stimuli 
 
 After completing the twelve trials, participants completed the post-test 
questionnaire used in Experiment 2 to assess implicit misordering detection. As the 
questionnaire was not administered until the end of the experiment, participants were 
asked once about all twelve videos, rather than once for each individual video. Because 
of this, a participant only needed to detect one of the six misorderings across the twelve 
trials to be considered as having detected a misordering. Additional data, such as number 
of misorderings incidentally detected across the twelve trials, is not reported, as this 
number would likely be skewed by recall failure. 
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Results 
 Across all participants, mean target clip detection was 90.35% (SD = 9.32). 
Detection of target clips in videos containing a misordering (mean = 84.21%, SD = 
17.10) was significantly lower than detection in videos without a misordering (mean = 
96.49%, SD = 6.98, t(18) = 2.93, p = .01). Only 31.58% of participants reported noticing 
any misordered actions. 
 A second analysis was conducted on the types of errors present in each video type 
(i.e., misses). Twenty-two errors occurred across 228 trials. Three of these errors were 
classified as “delayed” post hoc (both RTs > 3000 ms). Two errors received a “miss” 
classification due to a complete lack of response. Seventeen errors were classified as 
“anticipations”, which included responses before target initiation or under 200 ms after 
target onset (highest RT classified as an anticipation using these criteria was 66 ms). All 
anticipation errors occurred when subjects were responding to videos containing an out of 
order action. 76.47% of anticipation errors occurred in participants who did not notice 
any misorderings, with 50% of participants who did not notice misorderings producing at 
least one of these erroneous responses. 
 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 3a, participants were able to accurately recall an overwhelming 
majority of the actions in the event videos. Additionally, there was no relationship 
between performance on this memory task and ability to detect misorderings across the 
twelve videos.  It seems unlikely that the results of Experiments 1 and 2 were due to 
participants not understanding the series of actions in each video. If participants would 
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have displayed a consistent difficulty in reporting the actions portrayed in these videos, 
then it follows that their misunderstanding of the action sequences led them to fail to 
create an event schema, which would have hindered their ability to predict upcoming 
actions. While their recall was not perfect, this may be due to memory effects as well as 
selective reporting effects. Even though participants were told to prioritize reporting the 
actors’ actions in the videos, it is possible that they sometimes chose not to report a 
particular action in favor of brevity. Additionally, upon closer examination of 
participants’ responses, sub-100% scores were always due to a lack of information (i.e., 
failing to report a particular action), rather than a misrepresentation of the actions in the 
video (i.e., reporting an action that was not present). 
In Experiment 3b, most of the target clips, which must be perceived in order to detect 
misordered events, were detected. It appears unlikely that the results of Experiment 1 
were driven by an inability to detect the critical out of order clip. While detection rates in 
normal videos were higher than in videos containing a misordering, the effect was 
completely driven by the unique appearance of anticipation errors in responses to the out 
of order videos.   
Experiment 3b also provided additional evidence for a lack of incidental detection, as 
under a third of participants reported noticing at least one of the six misorderings after 
watching all twelve videos. However, these particular data should be interpreted with 
some caution, as participants were only asked about the presence of a misordered action 
after watching all twelve videos. It is possible that the rate of detection may have been 
influenced by other factors, such as memory effects. However, these results are 
unsurprising considering the low rate of incidental detection also found in Experiment 2.  
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Interestingly, in the clip detection task, we saw a number of anticipatory responses 
(anticipation errors), which only occurred in videos containing an out of order event. It is 
important to note that for these videos, if a participant made an anticipation error, they 
were endorsing seeing the target clip where it would have been shown if the action 
sequence was in the correct order. To revisit the coffee example, if the target clip was 
picking up a spoon from a table, and the misordered action sequence showed an actor 
stirring the coffee with the spoon, picking up the spoon from the table, and removing the 
spoon from the cup, these anticipatory responses occurred when the coffee was being 
stirred. As the majority of these errors occurred in participants who did not notice any 
misorderings, this pattern of results may actually imply a conceptual prediction for which 
perceptual verification is not necessary. They may have naturally generated some on-line 
prediction, but did not compare this prediction to the next perceived event, and did not 
verify whether or not the perceived event met their expectations. Further research would 
be needed to fully understand if and when these “unused” predictions are generated, and 
what purpose they serve. 
 While participants appear to understand the content of the stimuli videos, another 
potential reason for participants’ difficulty in detecting these misordered actions is that 
they are unable to retrieve the critical misordered clip from memory. This was tested in 
Experiment 4. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
EXPERIMENT 4 
 
In this experiment, we tested whether participants’ inability to detect misordered 
events was the result of an inability to remember the critical misordered action.  If ending 
the video immediately after the critical misordered clip increases misordering detection, 
then this could provide further evidence that the ability to use conceptual prediction in 
event perception at this timescale is an effortful process rather than some continuous on-
line predictive mechanism. This argument would be even more compelling if memory for 
the out-of-order clip itself remained the same across videos with normal and out-of-order 
events, as the misordering detection results could not be explained by lack of memory for 
this clip. To this end, in addition to measuring misordering detection, we also tested 
participants’ memory for the misordered clip immediately after each trial. 
 
Participants 
Fifteen undergraduate students (13 female; mean age = 20.13 years, SD = 1.41) 
were recruited from Vanderbilt University. Participants were compensated with course 
credit. 
 
Methods 
 All videos were presented as in Experiment 2. Half of the participants watched the 
twelve original videos shown in Experiment 1, the other half watched the same videos 
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with one major change – the videos ended immediately after the critical out of order clip 
(as defined in Experiment 3b) was displayed.  Due to the nature of the videos, this change 
required normal order videos in this condition to contain one fewer clip than videos 
containing a misordered action, as the critical clip occurred one action earlier in these 
videos. After each of the twelve videos in both conditions, a black screen was displayed 
for 2000 ms, after which participants were shown a screen with two images labeled A and 
B. One image was taken directly from the critical out-of-order clip from the video they 
just watched. The other image was taken from footage not used in the final versions of 
the videos, but that could have reasonably been included, such as a shot from a different 
angle, or from immediately before or after the action took place. Participants were asked 
to respond whether they saw image A or image B at any point in the previous video. 
Immediately after completing this task, participants were prompted to respond whether or 
not they noticed an out of order action. All participants were given ten seconds to answer 
these questions, and the images were displayed throughout the entire response period. 
 
Results 
 First, we investigated whether ending the videos immediately after the misordered 
action improved detection of the out of order event. On average, 70.83% (SD = 27.82) of 
the misorderings were detected in the abbreviated videos, while only 33.33% (SD = 
19.24) were detected in the full-length videos.  For videos that did not contain an out of 
order event, an average of 90.48% (SD = 16.27) of the full videos, and 87.50% (SD = 
17.25) of the abbreviated videos generated correct responses. While there was a 
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significant effect of video length on accuracy in the misordered videos (t(13) = 2.99, p = 
.01), this was not the case in the normal ordered videos (t(13) = -.34, p = .74).  
 
 
Figure 4. Effect of Video Type and Video Length on Correct Video Classification 
 
 Next, we examined the effect of video condition on memory for the target clip. In 
videos containing an out of order action, participants chose the correct image an average 
of 66.67% (SD = 33.33) of the time in full length videos, and 87.50% (SD = 17.25) of the 
time in abbreviated videos. In videos containing a correctly ordered sequence of events, 
participants chose the correct image an average of 76.19% (SD = 25.20) of the time in 
full length videos, and 91.67% (SD = 15.43) of the time in abbreviated videos. Whether a 
video contained a correct or misordered sequence did not significantly affect accuracy on 
the subsequent memory test (F(1,13) = .57, p = .46). Video length did affect recognition 
accuracy (F(1,13) = 5.10, p = .04), but it is important to remember that in the abbreviated 
versions of these videos, the target clip always immediately preceded the memory test. 
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This, however, was never the case for the full length videos. Finally, there was no 
significant video type by video length interaction effect (F(1,13) = .09, p = .77). 
 
 
Figure 5. Effect of Video Type and Video Length on Memory Task Performance 
 
Discussion 
 In this experiment, we found that stopping the videos immediately after the out-
of-order clip significantly improved participants’ ability to correctly detect the presence 
of misordered actions. This was not the case for correct rejections in videos that did not 
contain a misordering, however, this is possibly due to a ceiling effect, as performance in 
this condition was quite high overall. While video length also affected performance on 
the memory task, this was expected due to the shorter amount of time between the 
presentation of the to-be-remembered clip and the memory test in the abbreviated video 
condition. 
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 The pattern of results observed in Experiment 4 supports the idea that the out-of-
order action may indeed be in participants’ working memory, yet they are unable to 
reliably use that information when perceiving an event. When participants were allowed 
to respond immediately after the out-of-order action, their ability to detect misorderings 
improved, perhaps because they were immediately given the opportunity to engage in 
additional processing, such as comparing the most recently seen action to previous 
actions. While participants did perform better on the memory test in the abbreviated 
video condition, we do not believe this can fully explain the increased performance on 
the main video classification task, assuming that event prediction and error detection is an 
automatic and on-line process. If it were truly an important and continuously occurring 
action, participants should have noticed the event misordering soon after it occurred, 
rather than waiting until the end of the video to reconstruct the event sequence and 
analyze their memory of the order of actions. Under this hypothesis, the length of the 
video sequence should have no effect on detection of misordered events, although it 
would affect one’s memory for particular clips. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Across this series of experiments, we have come to a number of conclusions about 
people’s ability to make automatic predictions continuously while perceiving an event 
and use these predictions to detect when an unexpected event occurs. First, our 
participants’ performance on a misordering detection task decreased when they were 
asked to perform a secondary task. Second, their incidental performance on the task was 
lower than when they knew a misordering may be present. Third, their performance did 
not seem to be due to any difficulty in perceiving or understanding the stimuli. Finally, 
their performance improved when the event sequence stopped immediately after the 
unexpected event, allowing them to immediately engage in more effortful recall-based 
strategies, and removing any potential memory effects caused by the subsequent clips. 
Overall, while predictive processing is important in many areas of perception, it does not 
appear that moment-to-moment conceptual predictions in real-time event perception are 
used at the timescale represented by our stimuli.  
 While these findings have implications for the use of prediction in event 
perception in general, they have specific implications for Event Segmentation Theory 
(Zacks et al., 2007), which relies on an automatic prediction and error detection 
mechanism that operates at multiple timescales, simultaneously, to properly segment and 
ultimately understand events. For such a theory to be implemented, multiple requirements 
must be met. First, one’s ability to segment an event depends on the perception of change 
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and violation of predictions. If nothing changes, then predictions should be easy to 
generate, and no event segments will be created. The scope of these predictions is left 
somewhat ambiguous. However, according to the model, this should include perceptual, 
such as motion, and conceptual, such as those related to an agent’s intentions, 
predictions. While the on-line generation of perceptual predictions has been well 
established (e.g., representational momentum), the experiments described in this paper 
indicate that more conceptual predictions, such as predictions about an actor’s future 
actions, may not be used as the model suggests.  
Additionally, Event Segmentation Theory implies that event segmentation is an 
automatic part of perception that does not necessitate attention. This segmentation can 
occur simultaneously at multiple timescales, such as fine and coarse timescales. 
Therefore, event boundaries are perceived, even if they are not attended to. The results of 
Experiment 1 and 4 indicate that detection of unpredicted actions is not automatic, as it is 
greatly affected by a secondary task and improves when eliminating the presence of 
subsequent stimuli that may mask the memory of the out of order action. Real-time event 
segmentation would seem to require a completely automatic and effortless prediction, 
comparison, and model updating system, and the behavioral evidence does not 
necessarily support the hypothesis that these predictions are always automatic. 
Finally, according to Event Segmentation Theory, violations of event models 
should be available to conscious awareness, as the models are what enable individuals to 
understand the events in their immediate environment. When the models are violated, 
understanding fails. If a perceiver is not aware that the event has changed, then event 
understanding becomes difficult, if not impossible, as they no longer have the correct 
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event schema in place and would be continuously generating incorrect predictions based 
on outdated beliefs. In the experiments reported here, participants found it very difficult 
to detect the event misordering, particularly in the incidental detection task of Experiment 
3b. Interestingly, this experiment also showed some preliminary evidence for the 
presence of conceptual predictions that are not used. In making premature responses to 
the detection of the out-of-order clip itself, but not noticing the misordering, it seems as if 
occasionally participants expected the action to occur at a different time in the event 
sequence, but did not notice when reality failed to meet their expectations. In a way, it is 
as if there may be conceptual prediction that does not necessarily have the error-checking 
mechanism necessitated by models such as Event Segmentation Theory. 
There is additional evidence in the literature to suggest that this conscious 
awareness of an order violation is not guaranteed. Raisig, Welke, Hagendorf, and van der 
Meer (2010) showed participants images representing three actions that make up an event 
(e.g., “order food” then “eat food” then “pay the bill”). These actions typically occur in a 
particular order. However, on some trials the triplets were shown in an incorrect order. 
This temporal violation induced an increased pupillary response in all participants, which 
was evidence of increased processing at the time the misordering was viewed. The 
authors argued that this response provided evidence that participants detected the 
temporal violation. However, not all participants were able to consistently report that a 
violation had taken place.  
One potential extension of the experiments described in this paper would be a 
recreation of the incidental detection paradigm, with pupillary response as an on-line, 
non-explicit measure of detection. This could be used to determine the prevalence of 
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temporal violation detection that the participant is unable to later use in generating an 
explicit response. However, if this method is indeed measuring the error detection 
process that occurs in Zacks’ model, as argued by the authors, then it too does not appear 
to consistently lead to the necessary automatic updating of awareness. 
In conclusion, while both perceptual and conceptual predictions are important in a 
variety of day to day cognitive tasks, the experiments presented here indicate that online 
conceptual predictions are not important in typical event perception, as predicted by some 
models. If predictions are indeed generated, it seems unlikely that we are able to reliably 
use them to detect when an unexpected action occurs. These findings have implications 
for basic models of event perception, and suggest an underlying process that is not as 
closely tied to error checking the moment-to-moment sequential structure of events. 
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